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Abstract 
Three field studies conducted with academics and students examined the dynamic role 
of threat and normative support for a union in qualifying the relationship between 
union-related legitimacy and efficacy beliefs, and union intentions.There was evidence 
for interplay between threat and norms in facilitating people acting in accordance with 
their union beliefs, and in providing the conditions where those with weaker beliefs may 
be mobilized. In Study 1, students’ perception of threat to group interests facilitated 
their preparedness to act on pro-union legitimacy and efficacy beliefs. In Study 2, 
among academics who perceived low threat, acting on union legitimacy and efficacy 
beliefs was contingent on a pro-union norm, while those who perceived high threat 
were prepared to act on their union legitimacy beliefs regardless of the normative 
environment. Finally, in Study 3, a pro-union norm again facilitated acting on union 
beliefs in a low threat condition and overcame the importance of legitimacy and 
efficacy beliefs in a high threat condition. In sum, this research makes a case for the 
importance of union strategies attending to both the framing of intergroup threat and 
the communication of ingroup normative support for the union.  
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Like all social movements, unions experience alternating periods of member apathy and 
fervent activity linked to the demands of the wider context. Two aspects of context are 
crucial to galvanize supporters and recruit new members: the presence of threat to group-
based interests that creates a sense of us and them; and norms of solidarity that can promote 
shared understanding and agency (Gahan & Pekarek 2013; Klandermans, 1986). Social 
psychological research recognizes the importance of social context, yet models of collective 
action have typically been concerned with specifying the interrelationship between the 
psychological variables that mediate the influence of social context (e.g., injustice, identity 
and efficacy, Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008); and the role of identities in how 
people perceive and act on perceptions of social context (e.g., Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). 
Less attention has been paid to the dynamic role played by social context perceptions in 
whether and how people act on their beliefs.   
In this paper we examine the combined role of intergroup threat and in-group norms 
in galvanizing support for a union via their moderating effects on people’s union legitimacy 
and efficacy beliefs. We draw on the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) to conceptualize legitimacy and efficacy 
beliefs as, in part, the constituent properties of a union identity. Support for this reasoning is 
found in research showing that social identity facilitates and bridges injustice and efficacy 
explanations for collective action (Van Zomeren et.al., 2008), and that group efficacy 
mediates the relationship between an activist identity and collective action intentions 
(Blackwood & Louis, 2012). Accordingly, our premise is that although union legitimacy and 
efficacy beliefs may serve separate functions (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001) they are 
each subject to group-based processes of activation in social contexts that render union 
beliefs salient and behaviourally meaningful (Blackwood et.al., 2003; Blackwood & Louis, 
2012). 
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Threat 
Whether collective action is explained in terms of relative deprivation (Runciman, 
1966) or injustice (Peate, Platow & Eggins, 2008); at its core, it is a response to group-based 
threat. A review of strikes in the US showed both ‘realistic’ threat to employee interests and 
‘symbolic’ threat to union legitimacy as critical (Martin & Dixon, 2010). Of course belief in 
union legitimacy is tied to the notion that employers will from time to time threaten workers’ 
interests; and the rallying call ‘the workers united will never be defeated’ captures an article 
of faith in union effectiveness. We would expect that for those who believe in union 
legitimacy and efficacy, there would be a readiness to read employment-related threat in 
union-related terms and so to self-categorise as a union member and act in accordance with 
one’s union beliefs.  
There are also, however, grounds for arguing that when severe enough, threat may 
provide the conditions where those who are less convinced of union legitimacy and efficacy 
may be galvanized into action. This is well illustrated by Fosh’s (1993) longitudinal study 
where in the context of an industrial dispute over half of employees turned out for a branch 
meeting; and by Veenstra & Haslam’s (2000) study where low-union identifying members 
defied predictions by showing increased union support in an experimentally manipulated 
threat context. Such findings may point to people pursuing individualist strategies in defence 
of personal interests. But another reading that is not incommensurate with the first is that 
even for those with weaker union beliefs, threat to group interests produces a salient social 
identity resulting in ‘solidaristic’ group based strategies to protect collective interests 
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). This latter explanation is one that Fosh 
(1993) and Veenstra and Haslam (2000) found most convincing and that implicates social 
influence processes.  
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Norms 
A ‘critical mass’ of active union members is crucial for a union’s ability to sustain 
membership and mobilize around industrial disputes. This is supported by evidence for the 
importance of union presence (Dixon et al, 2004) and social networks in the workplace 
(Davis et, al., 2005). Such evidence is typically explained in terms of coercion or ‘rational’ 
calculations of the likelihood of success. Although both explanations may account for some 
portion of people’s behaviour, they fail to account for heightened feelings of solidarity 
observed in industrial disputes such as the 12-month British miners’ strike where many long-
term strikers thought that victory was unlikely (Winterton & Winterton, 1989).  
Research conducted from the social identity perspective presents an alternative 
hypothesis. According to the referent informational influence model (Turner et. al., 1987), to 
the extent that people identify with a group, they expect to be in agreement. Where 
normative attitudes and behaviors are congruent with their own, the process of self-
categorization should see an increase in attitude-behavior consistency (Terry, Hogg & 
Blackwood, 2001). Thus, in the context of the miner’s strike, solidarity is understood in 
terms of self-categorization with fellow strikers.  
Although researchers investigating these processes have typically examined the 
moderating role of identity in rendering people responsive to group norms, some have 
offered a less linear and uni-directional analysis. For instance Thomas, McGarty and 
Mavor’s (2009) normative alignment model specifies a dynamic interrelationship between 
social identity and the sharing of (normative) group-based emotions, beliefs and actions; and 
Swaab and colleagues’ (2007) experimental research suggests that while social identity can 
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lead to the production of shared systems of meaning, so too, awareness of shared systems of 
meaning can lead to social identity formation.  
The implication of the above is that norms provide a context in which the constituent 
beliefs of a social identity might be more readily acted upon. But more than this, knowledge 
of a group norm may define an experience as shared, thereby activating group processes of 
self-categorisation. That is to say, a pro-union normative climate would be expected to make 
people’s union beliefs relevant guides to thinking and acting. Such perceptions would both 
validate union legitimacy as well as strengthen perceptions of group efficacy. Pointing to 
these processes, Van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) found that knowledge that others 
shared one’s evaluations of an intergroup context and that others intended to act on their 
beliefs contributed to participation in collective action via group based anger rooted in 
legitimacy beliefs, as well as group efficacy.  
 
Threat and Norms 
Finally, based on this review there are grounds for considering the interrelationship 
between threat and norms in moderating people’s union legitimacy and efficacy beliefs. This 
is something which, to the best of our knowledge, has not received explicit attention. We test 
the idea that threat creates the ‘us and them’ context where the normative environment may 
be clearer and where it is meaningful for people, regardless of their commitment to the 
union, to attend to what their colleagues think. In the absence of threat, even the most 
committed unionist may remain inactive where it is not normative to be so. By the same 
token, in the presence of threat even the most disillusioned unionist may be open to the 
influence of pro-union members. Moreover, in the presence of threat, whilst for the 
committed unionist a pro-union norm may facilitate behaviour that is congruent with one’s 
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pro-union attitudes (Terry, Hogg & Blackwood, 2001), it does not follow that an 
attitudinally-incongruent norm will produce the opposite. Where there is perceived 
incongruency, people may challenge the group norm, or indeed, distance themselves from 
the group and self-categorise with those who share their values (e.g., fellow union members). 
Strike-related research provides evidence for this where, in a context of employment-related 
threat, those who believed in the union were seen to lift their effort in defiance of the 
workplace norm of not supporting the union (Oliver, 1984).  
 
Present Research 
 Three studies were conducted with academic members and non-members of 
Australia’s National Tertiary Industry Education Union (NTEU) and members of a 
university student union. In agreement with current theorising around social movement 
unionism and the organising model of unionism (Frege & Kelly, 2004), we see unions and 
social movement organisations as similar in so far as they are engaged in mobilizing political 
activism in response to outgroup threats. Accordingly, we argue that both the NTEU and the 
student union are appropriate organisations for examining these specific processes and the 
implications for unions.  
For the period of this research (2001-2003), the broad political context for both 
groups was framed by a conservative Federal Government that had placed reform of the 
Australian higher education sector high on its agenda. Included in its program of reforms 
were increased exposure of universities to market forces and competition, the devolution of 
responsibility for wages and conditions to the university level, and an increase in funding 
through student fees.  
 
We examined the following hypotheses:  
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H1 The perception of threat and a pro-union norm were each expected to be positively 
associated with intentions, independent of the contribution of legitimacy and efficacy beliefs.  
H2  The perception of threat and norm, were each expected to moderate the relationship 
between legitimacy and efficacy beliefs, and intentions. Where people perceived strong 
threat or a pro-union norm, we expected a positive association between beliefs and 
intentions. Where people perceived weaker threat or norms, we expected a weaker 
association and for intentions to remain low.  
H3  The perception of threat was proposed to qualify the interaction between the 
perceived norm and beliefs. Where people perceived low threat, we expected a positive 
association between beliefs and intentions to be contingent on perceiving a pro-union norm. 
Where people perceived high threat, we expected a pro-union norm to be associated with 
strong intentions regardless of beliefs and a weaker union norm to be associated with 
intentions in accordance with beliefs.    
 
Study 1 
Study 1 was conducted in the first part of 2001. An Australian Government proposal 
to introduce unregulated fees and market rates of interst for student loans presented a context 
in which to examine a salient threat to a student union’s constituency.  
 
Method 
Participants. Respondents (N=303) were first-year university students (Mage=19). 
Most were women (62%; n=187); 39 did not give their sex.  
Measures. A survey measured the dependent variable, intended behaviour and four 
independent variables (legitimacy, efficacy, threat, and norm). All items were on 7-point 
response scales and composite measures were created by averaging responses to component 
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items. Means, standard deviations and correlations for the composite variables are reported 
in Table 1.  
Behavioural intention. Students indicated willingness to engage in seven behaviours 
drawn from Veenstra and Haslam’s (2000) research (e.g., “be actively involved in the 
student union”; α=.91).  
Legitimacy. Respondents rated four items capturing global beliefs about the 
legitimacy of unions, commonly used in industrial relations research (e.g., “Australia would 
be better off without unions”; α=.81).  
Efficacy. Union efficacy was assessed in line with common operationalizations of 
Klandermans’ (1986) goal motive. Participants rated four student issues (i.e., representation, 
services, quality and funding of education) in terms of personal importance and union 
impact. The square root of the product of the two scores for each issue was calculated before 
averaging to create the composite measure (α=.80). 
Threat. Three items tapped the belief that full-fee paying places posed a threat to 
higher education and student prospects (e.g., “Will fee-paying places damage the perceived 
quality of degrees?”; α=.79).  
Norm. Two items measured perceptions of fellow students’ support for the student 
union (e.g., “Amongst my fellow students there is a culture of supporting the student union”; 
r=.66).  
Table 1 
 
Results 
 Two hierarchical regression analyses were conducted (Cohen & Cohen, 1983): one 
examining interaction effects for legitimacy and the other for efficacy (see Table 2). 
Legitimacy and efficacy beliefs were entered at Step 1 and threat and norm perceptions were 
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entered at Step 2. At Step 3, the products of one of the union-related beliefs and the threat 
and norm variables were entered to test for two-way interaction effects. At Step 4, the 
product of the union-related belief and both threat and norm was entered to test the three-
way interaction.  
Scores on each of the predictors were centered (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991). Two 
multivariate outliers with standardized residuals exceeding ±3.3 were removed (Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 1996), leaving 301 cases.  
 
Table 2 
 
As predicted, threat and norm perceptions were positively associated with intentions 
independent of the effects of legitimacy and efficacy beliefs; and the Threat x Legitimacy 
and Threat x Efficacy interactions were significant (ßs = .11, .17, ps = .009, .001 
respectively).  
 
Figure 1 
 
Simple slope analyses for one standard deviation above and below the threat mean, and 
inspection of the two-way interactions revealed a similar pattern (see Figure 1). Although 
respondents’ legitimacy and efficacy beliefs were positively associated with intentions 
regardless of threat perceptions, consistent with our hypothesis, the effects were stronger 
where they perceived high threat (ß = .43, p < .001 and ß = .44, p < .001 respectively) 
compared to lower threat (ß = .22, p < .001 and ß = .17, p = .004 respectively).  
 Contrary to our hypotheses norm perceptions did not moderate the role of people’s 
beliefs, either alone or in combination with perceptions of threat. This initial study was 
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conducted early in the academic year when first year students would have limited experience 
of the union and the normative environment. The second study was conducted with 
academics who we would expect to have stronger workplace identities and to be more 
knowledgeable about the normative environment. 
 
Study 2 
Study 2 was conducted in 2002 at the commencement of a new enterprise agreement. 
This was a period when industrial relations reforms and deregulation of higher education 
were on the government agenda.  
 
Method 
Participants. A survey was sent to a random sample of 1,200 university employees. 
In order to ensure some comparability with the student union sample where membership is 
compulsory, our respondents (N=215) included both members and non-members and we did 
not delineate between the two. The majority were members of the union (n=154) with an 
average 10 year membership. Slightly more men (54%) responded and ages ranged from 21 
to 66 (Mage = 44).  
Measures. A survey measured the same variables as in Study 1 (Table 3). The 
intentions measure comprised a subset of 4 items assessing intentions to keep abreast of 
union matters, volunteer, attend meetings and vote (α=.91); and the legitimacy (α=.88) and 
norm (r=.66) measures comprised the same items from Study 1. The efficacy and threat 
measures were modified to reflect the issues for this union.   
Efficacy. Respondents’ rated the impact they believed the union could have on seven 
employment-related issues (e.g., salary; employment conditions; employment security). This 
was weighted by issue importance (α=.92).  
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Threat. Two items measured perceived threat to employment conditions and the 
quality of teaching (e.g., the government’s industrial relations policy threatens employment 
conditions; r=.55). 
Tables 3 and 4  
 
Results 
 We conducted the same hierarchical regression analyses as for Study 1 (see Table 4). 
One multivariate outlier was removed from the analyses leaving 214 cases.  
Once again, threat and norm perceptions were positively associated with intentions 
independent of people’s beliefs. This time the Norm x Legitimacy and Norm x Efficacy 
interactions were each significant, (βs = .14, .21, ps = .027, <.001); and these interactions 
were qualified by a Threat x Norm x Legitimacy (β = -.14, p = .082) and a Threat x Norm x 
Efficacy interaction (βs= -.17, p = .013). 
 
Figures 2 and 3 
 
Simple slope analyses and inspection of the Norm x Legitimacy and Norm x Efficacy 
interactions at low and high threat revealed a similar overall pattern (see Figures 2 and 3 for 
the Norm x Legitimacy interactions). The interactions were significant for those who 
perceived low threat, (βs = .23, .27, ps < .001, .005), but not for those who perceived high 
threat, (βs = .07, .04, ps = .692, .398).  
As predicted, where respondents perceived low threat, a pro-union norm was 
associated with a significant positive effect of legitimacy and efficacy beliefs on intentions, 
βs = .53, .65, ps < .001. By contrast, where low threat was combined with a weaker norm, 
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intentions were low and there was only a marginal effect of legitimacy and no effect of 
efficacy beliefs, (βs = 14, .10, ps = .094, .253 respectively). Thus, in the absence of salient 
threat it was apparent that legitimacy and efficacy beliefs were not sufficient for people’s 
intentions to act. What was also required was a pro-union norm.  
Where respondents perceived high threat, we found mixed support for our 
predictions. Consistent with our predictions, the effect of legitimacy on intentions was 
significant regardless of perceived norm strength (βs = .36, .30, ps = .008, .008). Contrary to 
our predictions, high threat did not overcome the importance of norms in qualifying the 
relationship between efficacy beliefs and intentions. That is to say, people intended to act on 
their efficacy beliefs where they perceived a strong pro-union norm, t (β = .30, p = .006); but 
not where they perceived a weaker norm (β = .17, p = .111).  
 The strength of Studies 1 and 2 is that they were conducted in the field with real 
groups operating in different social contexts. The corollary to this is the difficulty in teasing 
apart cause and effect where perceptions of context and beliefs are necessarily correlated. 
This was addressed in Study 3.  
 
Study 3 
Study 3 was conducted with students in 2003 when the Government was proposing the 
introduction of domestic up-front fees (DUFF) and voluntary student unionism (VSU).  
 
Method 
Participants. Respondents (N=237) were first year students enrolled in second 
semester, between the ages of 16 and 60 (Mage=20). The majority were women (61%, 
n=143). 
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 Procedure and measures. Respondents completed a survey in which threat to 
student interests was manipulated. This was followed by a manipulation check and measures 
of the dependent variable (i.e., intentions) and the remaining independent variables (i.e., 
legitimacy, efficacy, and norm).  
Threat manipulation. Participants read a passage in which attention was drawn to 
either the likely increase in tuition fees by up to $10,000 (high threat); or the expected 
benefit of an expanded sector (low threat).  
 
High Threat: The Federal government has announced a package of policy changes to higher education. An 
important change allows each university to set its own fees. This University has set its fees at 30% above the 
HECS charges. In addition to creating more full-fee places for domestic undergraduate students, the HECS debt 
for students is expected to rise by up to $10,000. 
 
 
OR 
 
 
Low Threat: The Federal government has announced a package of policy changes to higher education. These 
policy changes are designed to make universities more globally competitive and bring resources into the sector. 
The Government has signalled its commitment to an expanded, well-resourced sector that can tailor programs 
to meet the diverse interests and circumstances of future students.  
 
 
Respondents then described the changes in their own words. Following examination 
of these descriptions, ten cases where the low threat condition had unintentionally made 
threat of fees salient were removed from the data. An independent t-test conducted on a one-
item measure of perceived threat (i.e., “To what extent do you see the proposed changes as a 
threat?”) confirmed a significant difference, t(225) = -4.52, p < .001, between low threat and 
high threat conditions (Ms = 3.75, 4.72).  
 Measures. Intentions was assessed using three items from Study 1, tapping how 
much students intended to be actively involved, vote, and explain the benefits to another 
student (α=.84). The measures of efficacy (α=.79) and norm (r=.71) were as per Study 1, 
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and the measure of legitimacy comprised three of the four items used in the previous studies 
(α=.81; see Table 5).  
Results 
 Following removal of four multivariate outliers, 223 cases were retained for the final 
analyses. The same hierarchical regression analyses were conducted as before (see Table 6).  
Tables 5 and 6  
As predicted the perceived norm was positively associated with union intentions 
independent of the effects of union beliefs. The threat manipulation did not have a direct 
effect on intentions and neither manipulated threat nor perceived norm moderated the role of 
legitimacy and efficacy beliefs. However, support was found for significant Threat x Norm x 
Legitimacy (β = -.13, p = .054) and Threat x Norm x Efficacy (β = -.16, p = .006) 
interactions. The Norm x Legitimacy and Norm x Efficacy interactions were again 
significant in the low threat condition, βs = .20, .25, ps = .020, .005, but not the high threat 
condition, βs = -.02, -.06, ps = .831, .371 (see Figures 4 and 5 for the Norm x Efficacy 
interactions).  
 
Figures 4 and 5 
As predicted, in the low threat condition a strong pro-union norm facilitated people 
acting in accordance with their legitimacy and efficacy beliefs, βs = .65, ps < .001. When the 
perceived norm was weak, there was a smaller, albeit significant effect of legitimacy, and no 
effect of efficacy beliefs, βs = .24, .14, ps = .040, .236.  
In the high threat condition, where people perceived weaker normative support there 
was a positive relationship between legitimacy and intentions (β = .25, ps = .013) and 
between efficacy and intentions (β = .25, p = .006). That is to say, we found support for our 
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prediction that high threat would provide the condition where those who believe in the union 
would disregard an attitudinally incongruent norm of weak support. Where people perceived 
stronger normative support, the relationship between legitimacy and intentions was only 
marginally significant (β = .21, ps = .084) and the relationship between efficacy and 
intention was non-significant (β = .13, p = .297). Inspection of the interactions suggested that 
those with weaker beliefs were lifting their intentions to be more commensurate with those 
who held strong beliefs. This is in accordance our prediction and with the notion that in 
times of threat, there are conditions such as awareness of others’ willingness to act which 
may mobilize less committed members.  
 
Discussion 
Across all three-studies, support was found for the proposition that whilst belief in 
the legitimate role of unions in the employment relationship and belief that one’s union can 
be effective in advancing employees’ interests are important to union intentions, one’s 
perceptions of the social context also matter. In support of H1, the perception of threat to 
group interests and of a normative environment supporting union behaviour made a direct 
and unique contribution to the models investigated. In support of H2, perceived threat 
facilitated students’ intentions to act on their legitimacy and efficacy beliefs, (Studies 1 and 
3), and perceived pro-union norm facilitated academics’ intentions to act on these beliefs 
(Study 2). Finally, in support of H3, in the absence of threat there was evidence for pro-
union norms facilitating intentions to act in accordance with one’s beliefs (Studies 2 & 3). In 
the presence of threat, people were intending to act in defiance of a weak norm of support 
for the union where they held strong legitimacy beliefs (Studies 2 & 3) and efficacy beliefs 
(Study 3). Morevoer, a pro-union norm lifted the intentions of people with weaker 
legitimacy and efficacy beliefs (Study 3).  
Threat and norms: The context of union behavior                                                   
17 
 
The focus of our research was how social context provides the conditions where 
people may be more or less likely to act in accordance with their union beliefs. In 
accordance with the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) 
our theoretical premise was that perceptions of intergroup threat and in-group norms are 
critical to the activation of group processes that may render group-related beliefs salient and 
meaningful guides to behaviour. In keeping with this premise, what was most clear across 
the studies was that in low threat contexts intentions were low and the more committed were 
prepared to be active only where it was normative to be so. That is to say in the absence of 
both threat and a pro-union normative environment ‘true-believers’ may remain inactive. 
This is consistent with activists’ understandings about the importance of visible union 
presence to the ongoing ‘maintenance’ behaviours that are so critical between periods of 
conflict. Further research on the intra-group processes involved in the day-to-day behaviours 
of core activists who maintain, build and shape collective action is thus sorely needed (see 
Louis, 2009). 
When we turn to perceptions of high threat, the picture becomes more complex. This 
was a context in which we expected that consistent with strike-related research (e.g., Oliver, 
1984), ‘true believers’ would be prepared to stand in solidarity with the union in defiance of 
the local norm and potentially in the face of defeat. We found the clearest evidence for this 
from those who held strong legitimacy beliefs with intentions if anything strengthend where 
normative support was perceived to be low. Those with strong efficacy beliefs were also 
undeterred by a weak norm, although only in Study 3. One explanation that could not be 
tested here is that in this context, committed union members were identifying with those who 
shared their beliefs. High threat is also a context where theory and research (e.g., 
Branscombe et al., 1999; Fosh, 1993; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000) suggest that those who are 
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less committed may self-categorize and be influenced by an in-group norm. We found 
evidence for this too, although only in Study 3.  
We are mindful of the inconsistencies and limitations in this research and the 
importance therefore of not overstating our findings. Most particularly, this research was 
conducted with two very different groups; it was correlational and conducted in singular 
contexts where the salience of threat was not always clear; and we were only able to 
approximate behavior through the measure of intentions. To overcome these limitations 
requires longitudinal field research where an effort is made to trace ‘objective’ contextual 
changes associated with actual mobilization and de-mobilization. In so doing, one question 
that warrants closer attention is how we disentangle people’s perceptions of the ‘objective’ 
context (e.g., the perception that people are indeed united and that there is a contextual norm 
of support for a campaign) from more enduring identity-based beliefs (e.g., “the workers 
united will never be defeated”). 
Notwithstanding the above caveat, our research is consistent with models showing 
that social support plays an important role in collective action via affirming people’s beliefs 
(van Zomeren, 2004). What is novel is that our research also suggests that there are 
conditions where low social support may lead to greater exertion on the part of the 
committed and where high social support may see non-believers drawn into the fold. These 
differential effects suggest that some benefit might be derived from drawing on the wider 
literature on social influence. For instance, in keeping with recent research addressing the 
‘moral’ dimensions of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2011), one direction of enquiry 
might be the role played by injunctive as well as descriptive norms. Smith and Louis (2008) 
have shown in a study of student activism that where strongly held principles are concerned, 
an injunctive norm that is congruent with one’s attitude is particularly influential and may 
indeed overcome the effects of a contradictory, incongruent descriptive norm.  
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Taken together our research demonstrates that the processes involved in collective 
action are more dynamic and nuanced than is currently captured in our models. We conclude 
with the observation that examining these more dynamic processes is not just of theoretical 
importance. Central to current debates within union movements is concern about the 
demobilizing consequences of neoliberal models of unionism with their emphasis on 
demonstrating union contribution to productivity; and servicing models of unionism which 
individualise members’ interests (e.g., Milkman & Voss, 2004). Our research is in agreement 
with proponents of social movement unionism and the organizing model in suggesting that 
critical to the success of unions is the collectivisation of members through strategies that 
emphasise structural inequalities of power and create visible cultures of solidarity in the 
workplace.  
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, Intercorrelations, and Scale Reliabilities for Study 1 
  M  SD  N  1   2   3   4   5 
1. Intention   3.50 1.51 289 1.00     
2. Legitimacy   4.86 1.23 301 .561** 1.00    
3. Efficacy   5.32 .80 291 .571** .478** 1.00   
4. Threat   5.06 1.36 289 .472** .288** .371** 1.00  
5. 
a
Norm   2.83 1.23 301 .417** .268** .443** .196** 1.00 
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Table 2 
Moderated Regression Analysis Predicting Union Intended Behaviour for Study 1 
     1    2    3a   3b   4a   4b 
Step Variable                         
1 Legitimacy .37*** .32***  .32*** .30*** .32*** .30*** 
 Efficacy .39*** .25***  .25*** .30*** .26*** .30*** 
2 Threat  .25***  .26* .28*** .25*** .28*** 
 Norm  .17***  .16** .15** .15**  .15** 
3a Threat x Legitimacy    .11**   .12**  
 Norm x Legitimacy    .05   .05  
 Threat x Norm   -.02  -.02  
3b Threat x Efficacy     .17**   .17** 
 Norm x Efficacy     .04   .04 
 Threat x Norm    -.06  -.06 
4a Threat x Norm x Legitimacy      .03  
4b Threat x Norm x Efficacy       .00 
R
2
  .435 .514 .531 .536 .531 .536 
Fch  109.94*** 23.22*** 3.30* 4.51**   .37   .00 
*
p < .05, 
**
p < .01, 
***
p < .001, two-tailed. 
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Table 3 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Study 2 
 M SD N 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Intention   3.81 1.70 215    1.00     
2. Legitimacy   5.73 1.28 215 .505
**
   1.00    
3. Efficacy   5.60 0.81 214 .483
**
 .391
**
   1.00   
4. 
a
Threat   6.00 1.06 215 .354
**
 .487
**
 .237
**
   1.00  
5. 
a
Norm   4.38 1.44 215 .432
**
 .334
**
 .385
**
 .213
**
 1.00 
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Table 4 
Moderated Regression Analysis Predicting Union Intended Behaviour for Study 2 
     1    2   3a   3b   4a   4b 
Step Variable                         
1 Legitimacy .37*** .28*** .31*** .29*** .32*** .29*** 
 Efficacy .34*** .27*** .29*** .29*** .31*** .32*** 
2 Threat  .11
+
 .14* .13* .15* .18** 
 Norm  .21*** .20** .20** .24***  .21*** 
3a Threat x Legitimacy    .07   .01  
 Norm x Legitimacy    .14*   .13*  
 Threat x Norm   -.12
+
  -.13*  
3b Threat x Efficacy    -.04  -.10* 
 Norm x Efficacy     .21***   .17** 
 Threat x Norm    -.06  -.02 
4a Threat x Norm x Legitimacy     -.14
+
  
4b Threat x Norm x Efficacy      -.17* 
R
2
  .351 .399 .422 .437 .430 .454 
Fch  57.02*** 8.44*** 2.63* 4.59** 3.05
+
 6.28* 
*
p < .05, 
**
p < .01, 
***
p < .001, two-tailed. 
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Table 5 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Study 3 
  M  SD  N   1   2   3   4   5 
1. Intention   3.50 1.51 237 1.00     
2. Legitimacy   5.14 1.26 237 .536** 1.00    
3. Efficacy   5.39 .82 237 .515** .560** 1.00   
4. Threat [manip]   1.49 .50 237 -.041 -.070 .022 1.00  
5. Norm   2.76 1.27 237 .428** .361** .299** -.057 1.00 
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Table 6 
Moderated Regression Analysis Predicting Union Intended Behaviour for Study 3 
     1    2   3a   3b   4a   4b 
Step Variable                         
1 Legitimacy .39*** .32*** .35***  .32*** .35*** .33*** 
 Efficacy .30*** .27*** .27***  .30*** .28*** .29*** 
2 Threat  -.02 -.02 -.03 .02 .02** 
 Norm  .22*** .22***  .22*** .22***  .24*** 
3a Threat x Legitimacy   -.09
+
  -.12*  
 Norm x Legitimacy    .06    .08  
 Threat x Norm   -.02  -.01  
3b Threat x Efficacy    -.11
+
  -.14* 
 Norm x Efficacy     .03   .07 
 Threat x Norm    -.02  -.02 
4a Threat x Norm x Legitimacy     -.12*  
4b Threat x Norm x Efficacy      -.17** 
R
2
  .371 .414 .428 .428 .440 .449 
Fch  64.88*** 8.04*** 1.74 1.76 4.66* 8.18** 
*
p < .05, 
**
p < .01, 
***
p < .001, two-tailed. 
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Figure 1. Interaction between perceived threat and union legitimacy on union intention. 
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Figure 2. Interaction between perceived norm and union legitimacy on union intention in 
context of perceived low threat. 
  
Threat and norms: The context of union behavior                                                   
32 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction between perceived norm and union legitimacy on union intention in 
context of perceived high threat. 
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Figure 4. Interaction between perceived norm and union efficacy on union intention in 
condition of manipulated low threat. 
 
  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Low efficacy High efficacy
In
te
n
d
e
d
 U
n
io
n
 B
e
h
a
v
io
r 
Strong norm
Weak norm
Threat and norms: The context of union behavior                                                   
34 
 
 
Figure 5. Interaction between perceived norm and union efficacy on union intention in 
condition of manipulated high threat. 
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